Abstract-The degree of liberalization in OECD electricity markets varies considerably across countries. Commonly, these differences are explained by diverging economic developments and varying political systems. The empirical estimations reported in this paper, however, suggest another reason: The more a step towards full competition in the electricity sector reduces the tax revenues generated by this industry, the less likely is its implementation. We conjecture that this relationship is especially caused by the persistent financial dependency of regulatory decision-makers on governments, which results in authorities that shrink from reforms which reduce the executive's and hence their own financial ressources. In this case, a clear delineation of a regulator's budgetary interests from its regulatory goals is vital to achieve the latter.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE degree of liberalization that has been realized in the electricity sector up to today varies considerably across countries. This becomes obvious in figure 1 , where an OECD indicator [1] is used to depict the intensity of competition in 30 OECD electricity markets both before and after the major reforms that have been implemented nearly everywhere in this industry since around 1990 [2] . The sector indicator applied (which is a component of the Energy, Transport and Communication Regulation (ETCR) measure described in detail in [3] and section III) captures the design of the entry regulation as well as the degree of vertical integration and public ownership and ranges from 0 (competition-enhancing regulation) to 6 (regulatory environment impeding competition). The ordinate values of the data points describe the pre-reform situation and reveal little competition in all sample countries. This implies only few variations in the national sectoral structures (apart from four exceptions the index just takes values between 5 and 6). The abscissa values that reflect the post-liberalization situation, on the contrary, demonstrate a large variety of regulatory regimes. Moreover, they unveil notable differences in the liberalization speed: In case of a homogeneous pace, all observations would lie on a straight line with a positive slope.
Several empirical studies provide different explanations for these variations in liberalization: Reference [4] analyzes the effect of a number of possible economic and political explanatory factors. It applies changes in the Economic Freedom of H. Lindemann is with the Department of Economics and Management, University of Hannover, Koenigsworther Platz 1, 30167 Hannover, Germany; e-mail: lindemann@sopo.uni-hannover.de. the World (EFW) index [5] as a measure for overall liberalization in 57 countries. The study finds that for the period from 1970 to 1999 economic liberalization (containing, inter alia, also reforms in the electricity sector) is higher when countries went through an inflation or a growth crisis. For the latter type, however, the paper shows that only a deep crisis (defined as a 5-year-period with an average GDP growth rate smaller than -1%) leads to notable modifications. Medium growth crises, on the contrary, even imply a weaker willingness to reform than positive growth rates. Additionally, the results reveal that liberalization efforts are higher in democracies than in autocracies and in states with a functioning system of checks and balances.
Reference [6] aims to combine two of the results of [4] and extends the estimation of the impact of growth performance and political regime type on liberalization by an interaction term of both these factors. The results for a sample of 123 countries confirm the positive relationship between democracy and liberalization, but cast doubts on the liberalizationenhancing effect of growth crises. The paper rather shows that between 1970 and 2004 the EFW score is only positively affected after an economic downturn if at the same time a country is a democracy or its political system includes a high number of veto players. Conversely, under autocratic regimes reforms are only introduced after periods of extremely strong growth.
Reference [7] surveys in how far the ideology of govern-ments in 21 OECD countries between 1980 and 2003 had an influence on the overall regulation of seven non-manufacturing sectors, one of which is electricity. The study applies the ETCR indicator [1] to measure the degree of liberalization, whereas the political direction of the ruling party is captured by either Potrafke's [8] or Bjørnskov's [9] ideology index. The estimation results reveal that market-orientation is essential for right-wing governments during decisions on regulatory measures. Hence, liberalization efforts are higher in countries with a more rightist political leadership. Finally, [10] focusses on the regulation of the electricity sector in the EU-15 countries and 10 further member states which acceded to the EU in 2004. It analyzes the effect of the percieved corruption in a country (measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International [11] , see [12] for details) on the degree of vertical separation between generation and transmission. Splitting these activities is rated to be one of the most important prerequisites for a successful realization of fully competitive electricity markets [13] , [14] . The findings suggest that between 2001 to 2006 vertically integrated companies in EU-15 states took advantage of less righteous officials and politicians and obtained a less stringent separation by paying bribes, whereas in the 10 accession states apparently exactly the opposite was the case. However, the authors suspect that the converse results for the new member states are induced by fraudulent reports on their true unbundling situation especially in the years before 2004, bacause a failure in implementing the stipulated degree of unbundling would have jeopardized their accession. Since compared to restructuring the whole electricity sector in order to meet EU requirements misreporting was particularly easy to realize in very corrupt countries, it is conjectured that in fact the correlation between the degree of unbundling and the CPI was the same in EU-15 and accession states.
Just as [10] , our paper concentrates on the intensity of unbundling in the electricity sector, i.e. the degree of vertical separation between the industry's natural monopolies (transmission and distribution networks) and potentially competitive stages of the value chain (generation, wholesale, and retail). It suggests that the financial consequences of regulatory decisions on this aspect of liberalization might have an impact on the regulation finally implemented by the responsible public authorities. We conjecture that competition-enhancing steps of reform are delayed whenever they entail a considerable reduction of the tax revenues generated in the electricity sector: due to the financial dependence of regulatory decisionmakers on the government that existed in the past and prevails until today, regulatory authorities would otherwise have to fear lower governmental appropriations. In the next section, this hypothesis and its background are further elucidated. Section III describes the data and the estimation approach applied to test our conjecture empirically. In sections IV and V the regression results are reported and discussed. Section VI concludes.
II. EXPLANATORY APPROACH
Before the reform process in the electricity sector gathered momentum around 1990 [2] , primarily ministries influenced all relevant decisions in this industry. Examples from Europe are Austria, where the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Labour was the most important regulatory player at that time [15] , or Germany, where the Ministry of Economics together with the Antitrust Authorities of the federal states was primarily responsible for regulation [16] . In the following, this apparent proximity between regulatory decision-makers and the state induces us to assume that regulatory actors did not only pursue the common objective of supervising the vertically integrated utilities [17] usually active in all stages of the sector at that time. Instead, we suppose that they also took the state budget into account when they fostered or delayed liberalization. The background of this conjecture is basically provided by Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy: It alleges that apart from the output (which is equivalent to the achievement of regulatory objectives in the case of regulators) employees of state institutions also try to maximize the authority's budget. With increasing financial means they get higher salaries and additional perquisites which, in turn, increase the officials' utility [18] , [19] . Since the budget allocated to a state's ministry is closely related to the prevailing budgetary position of the state, it is plausible to assume that civil servants working in the ministry responsible for electricity regulation consider the effects of their work on national finances. As a consequence, they might shrink from implementing regulations that negatively affect public revenue.
At the beginning of national reform processes (purportedly) independent regulatory authorities (IRAs) were usually established [20] in order to control the sector's natural monopolies persisting in transmission and distribution without any external interference. However, most probably they also have an interest in a good financial position of the state, as several studies suggest: Reference [21] surveys 175 regulators from 88 countries (including 31 energy regulators) and finds out that according to their statutes the funding of more than 60 percent of the authorities comes either fully or partially from government.
On a scale from 0 to 1 (where 1 stands for full statutory independence from government) 14 European electricity regulators reach an average financial and organisational independence of just under 0.75. This suggests that a certain dependence of the authorities from the state's budgetary position might exist [20] .
The survey results of [22] are in line with the findings of [21] and [20] as well. The study shows that 8 out of 15 energy regulators get all or parts of their funding from the government. In addition, the government in 4 out of the 15 countries is in charge of the authorities' personnel policy and, inter alia, determines the level of salaries in the course of this function.
Finally, also [23] confirms a limited financial independence of European energy IRAs which -together with the results cited above -justifies the conjecture of a certain interest of regulators in national finances: in 11 out of 27 counties surveyed the regulators are not financially autonomous since their budget forms part of the state budget. In 8 of the countries the regulatees are not involved in the funding of the authority, implying that the state alone has to provide the financial means required to ensure the regulator's operations. Finally, the study reveals that salaries of the regulatory decision-makers in 11 out of 27 countries are determined by or depend on the national salary scales for civil servants or government officials, respectively, whereas the same is true for the regulatory staff in 15 countries. Since the remuneration of public employees is commonly more generous in times of bulging coffers, it might be reasonable to assume that regulatory authorities favor high public revenues.
However, with respect to IRAs research suggests another argument for an authority's interest in a good budgetary position of the state which is not related to Niskanen's [18] , [19] utilitymaximizing officials: Given that the companies IRAs have to supervise are equipped with considerable ressources [24] that can be employed to impede a regulator's work, authorities need equivalent means to properly fulfil their tasks [25] . Then, the financial dependency on the state that often still exists makes it reasonable to assume that also authority members just aiming for an appropriate regulation favor high state revenues.
With the reasons for an interest of regulators in public budget surpluses outlined, we now hypothesize that public institutions responsible for electricity sector regulation are influenced in their decisions, being prone to rulings that better satisfy their financial needs. Regulation is reflected by the degree of vertical separation enforced. Furthermore, the consequences for the state budget induced by different regulatory measures are proxied by the rates of the corporate income tax and the electricity VAT, capturing two sources of public revenues that primarily affect one of the market sides each. We start to elucidate the ideas behind this choices by concentrating on the corporate income tax first: For this purpose, let us compare the extreme cases of vertical connections in the electricity sector. In case of full integration, the linkages between the natural monopoly (i.e., the grids) and generation, wholesale, and retail prevent any competition in the latter areas of the branch. This generates monopolistic market structures also in the potentially competitive stages of the value chain. With full separation, on the contrary, commercial interests of the natural monopoly in generation, wholesale and retail companies no longer exist. Hence, full competition arrives in this areas [26] . We know from microeconomic theory that in case of a given demand curve the supply in a competitive market results in a higher quantity and a lower price as compared to a monopoly. Furthermore, theory shows that due to the dominance of the price increase over the output reduction the gains of a monopolistic supplier exceed the overall profits of potential competitive counterparts [27] . The tax base of a profit tax is thus always higher with vertical integration. Since equilibrium output is not distorted by a profit tax regardless of the market structure [28] , [29] , we can finally conclude that with any corporate income tax rate the tax yields in a non-competitive electricity sector are always higher. Moreover, the public revenue gap increases with higher corporate income tax rates. As a consequence, the tax losses that occur when corporate incomes are curtailed due to the implementation of competition-enhancing reforms are greater, the more heavily company profits are taxed. Since we expect that lower tax revenues, inter alia, translate into budget cuts for ministries or authorities responsible for regulation, respectively, we conjecture that regulatory decision-makers hesitate to foster vertical separation when corporate income tax rates are high.
Similar considerations hold for the VAT rate on electricity. Again, we expect regulators to delay steps of reform more strongly when higher tax losses are caused by liberalization. However, unlike in case of a profit tax it is unclear whether introducing competition reduces tax revenues at all, as the implementation of a VAT creates both price and quantity effects (when usual supply and demand curves are assumed) [30] . First, for any given VAT rate it depends on the elasticities of supply and demand whether the lower pre-tax price in competitive electricity markets outweighs the higher electricity amount purchased. The impact of vertical separation on tax revenues is thus ambiguous. Second, the elasticities of supply and demand also determine whether the tax maximizing supply structure is independent of the VAT rate or not, since with higher rates price effects will be of greater importance for the tax yield. The revenue maximizing degree of competition might therefore change. With respect to the electricity VAT, it is hence unclear whether a high or a low tax rate impedes vertical separation. We therefore take up this issue when our regression results are discussed in section V.
III. DATA AND METHODS
In order to capture the development of vertical separation in the electricity markets of different OECD countries, we draw on a sub-indicator of the ETCR measure provided by the OECD [1] .
The ETCR indicator provides a summarizing index value for the overall effectiveness of regulation in seven nonmanufacturing sectors by assessing their level of competition. It is obtained in several steps [3] : At first, two to four subindicators are calculated for the seven sectors (passenger air transport, telecom, electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight). The number of sub-indicators differs depending on whether the issues covered by the five existing types (entry barriers, public ownership, vertical integration, market structure, and price controls) are relevant for the competitive situation in the respective sector or not. In case of an existing relevance, various questions that capture the organization of main aspects included in the particular indicator type are answered on the basis of a wide range of data sources. Then, values between 0 and 6 are assigned to the organizational options. The value increases with answers that indicate less competitive environments. Finally, a weighted average of all answer values is calculated to obtain the sub-indicator. In the next step, the values of the sub-indicators determined for a particular sector are averaged in order to get the indicator for this industry. In the end, the simple average of all sector indicators yields the ETCR indicator which is available for 30 OECD countries and the period from 1975 to 2007.
Since we are interested in the degree of separation in the electricity sector, we focus on the vertical integration subindicator for exactly this branch. Its value equals the average of the values assigned to the answers to the following two questions (answer values in parentheses) [ Then, to test the relationship between the degree of unbundling and the rate of the corporate income tax and the electricity VAT, respectively, we estimate the equation
The dependent variable vi it denotes the degree of vertical separation, measured by the vertical integration sub-indicator value outlined above. Our main explanatory variable is the tax rate tax it . Since we are interested in the influence of the corporate income as well as the value added tax, we run different estimations and switch the tax type each time. The vector X it contains several control variables which ensure that a country's budgetary position, its energy intensity and the findings of former empirical studies are incorporated in our analysis. They are described in more detail in the following section. The country and year dummies cdum i and ydum t , respectively, enable us to control for differences in country characteristics as well as for possible shocks and trends over time. Finally, it describes the usual error term. Table I illustrates the regression results from OLS estimation, starting with a simple model in column (1) . It solely estimates the impact of the corporate income tax rate on the intensity of regulation. As expected, the coefficient has a positive sign and is highly significant, suggesting that a higher tax rate impedes the vertical separation of the electricity sector (recall at this point that the dependent variable increases when the degree of unbundling is lower).
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS: CORPORATE INCOME TAX

A. Basic Results
In the next step, we include both the tax revenue and the government debt with a lag of one year (data are obtained from [32] ). Given our remarks on Niskanen's theory of bureaucracy [18] , [19] above, one could expect a negative sign of the tax yield coefficient, whereas a positive sign would be plausible for total debt. High tax receipts in the preceding year reduce the necessity to generate additional public revenue by upholding an anti-competitive degree of unbundling: substantial existing funds already allow a corresponding appropriation to the regulator. High past debts of a state, on the contrary, impede a generous equipment of governmental institutions. The results in columns (2) to (7) reveal that both the tax and the debt coefficient show the expected sign, but only the former can reach statistical significance (which, however, disappears in the last estimation). The highly significant positive corporate income tax rate coefficient is confirmed in the second estimation, from which on also country and year dummies are included.
In column (3), we extend the estimation to allow for the economic performance of a country in the previous year. The so-called "crisis hypothesis" which is -as mentioned in the introduction -empirically tested in [4] states that severe economic downturns facilitate the implementation of liberalization measures, since the concomitant circumstances force opponents to give up their resistance. A declining standard of living should hence foster the unbundling process, so that we can expect a positive coefficient for the lagged growth rates of the real GDP. The latter are calculated on the basis of real GDP data obtained from [33] . However, our estimation results do not support the "crisis hypothesis". The growth rate coefficient rather has an unexpected negative sign in most of the cases which is even statistically significant at the 10% level in column (4) and (5). Significance is lacking, on the contrary, when the coefficient becomes positive in our last estimation. The significance level of the positive tax rate coefficient, however, persists, so that also the extended model in column (3) supports our hypothesis of a negative relationship between high tax rates and the degree of separation.
Subsequently, we control for the energy intensity in the sample countries by including the primary energy supply per GDP unit as a proxy [34] . The significant negative estimation coefficients that show up in column (4) and (5) are in line with our expectations: high needs of primary energy caused by, e.g., extreme weather conditions or energy-intensive industries strengthen the desire for cheap electricity. Accordingly, it is somewhat surprising that the coefficient loses significance in the penultimate column and finally even switches its sign. Nevertheless, our hypothesis is not challenged by the results in column (4), as the corporate income tax rate coefficient once again suggest a separation-hampering effect of higher tax rates.
In column (5), we take up the results of [10] and extend the estimation by a control variable for the level of corruption prevailing in a country. Just as [10] , we apply the CPI compiled by Transparency International [11] for this purpose, which ranges from 0 to 10 and increases as the extent of bribery (1)- (7) show estimation results of standard linear OLS estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
decreases. Since [10] shows that more corrupt countries tend to procrastinate vertical seperation, we expect a negative coefficient. Apart from the lacking statistical significance occurring in column (5), the findings reported in table I meet our expectations. Moreover, the significance of the positive tax coefficient persists, so that our conjecture is also confirmed when we control for a country's level of corruption.
In the penultimate column, we include the government ideology as additional control variable. Reference [7] has shown that the political orientation of governments can significantly affect the regulation of non-manufacturing markets in OECD countries, including the energy sector. We thus apply Potrafke's ideology index [8] to catch the conjectured effect. It takes values between 1 and 5 and increases as the share of seats left-wing parties hold in a parliament grows. Based on the findings in [7] , we hence expect a positive sign of the ideology coefficient. Besides, the inclusion of the index can be seen as a proxy for the attitude of the decision-makers in the authority towards the necessary intensity of regulation. On the one hand, one might argue that in a democracy the shares of leftist and rightist members in the deciding body roughly correspond to the shares in the electorate. In this case, the government ideology index would also reflect the political attitude of the agency's executives. On the other hand, it happens quite often that after a change of government leading positions of important public authorities are restaffed by civil servants that stem from government circles. Then, it is very likely that the standpoint of the new senior management regarding the essential degree of vertical separation is consistent with the governmental view, so that it is well possible to capture the executives' thinking by government indices. The statistically highly significant coefficients on ideology in the last two columns of table I reveal the same relationship between the political direction of a government and the intensity of regulation that was found out in [7] for the overall regulation of non-manufacturing markets: rightist governments strive for a pro-competitive regulatory environment and choose hence a higher degree of unbundling for the national electricity sector in our case. In addition, also our hypothesis is further supported by the findings reported in column (6), since both the sign and the significance level of the tax rate coefficient persist.
This also holds true for the last column, where we finally add an EU dummy variable. The liberalization of the European energy markets as well as the realization of a single EU market in the end is one of the major objectives of the European Commission's energy policy. This is why three legislative packages for an internal EU gas and electricity market have been implemented until today which include as many electricity directives ( [14] , [35] , [36] ). They require, inter alia, the implementation of increasingly stronger forms of unbundling in the member states, so that we follow [7] and control for an EU membership as well ( applying data reported by [37] ). As expected, the coefficient on the EU dummy is negative and highly significant, thus confirming a liberalization-enhancing effect of an EU membership. This, however, contradicts the findings from [7] which surprisingly found a non-significant and even positive coefficient.
B. Robustness Checks
We run several regressions with alternative control variables to check the robustness of our findings. The estimation results are reported in parts in table II. First, the lagged tax revenue and the lagged government debt as percentages of GDP (data obtained from [32] ) substitute the lagged total tax revenue as well as the lagged total government debt. Furthermore, the lagged GDP per capita growth rate (calculated on the basis of GDP per capita data provided by [33] ) is used instead .7922 N 438 Note: Estimation results of standard linear OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
of the lagged GDP growth rate. The primary energy supply per capita, an alternative measure of energy intensity [34] , is substituted for the primary energy supply per GDP unit. Finally, we replace Potrafke's ideology index [8] by Bjørnskov's measure [9] which ranges from -1 to 1 and exhibits high values when right-wing parties dominate a parliament. It is obvious that except from the coefficient on the last mentioned control variable the expected signs of the new controls correspond to those of their predecessors. The coefficient sign of Bjørnskov's ideology index [9] , on the contrary, should be negative, since in comparison to Potrafke's measure [8] the assignment of values to political orientations is carried out exactly the other way round. Transparency International's CPI as well as the EU dummy are incorporated unchanged in the regression.
The results reported in table II confirm our main initial finding: As in table I, we can observe a positive coefficient for the corporate income tax rate which is statistically highly significant and therefore indicative for a negative relationship between the level of corporate taxation and the degree of unbundling. Furthermore, also the separation-enhancing effect of an EU membership and a low degree of corruption persist. A higher market-orientation of right-wing governments is suggested by the first robustness check as well, but in comparision to the regression that includes Potrafke's index [8] , the coefficient on government ideology does not reach statistical significance. A positive relationship between high government debts and lower degrees of unbundling that is indicated by the results reported in table I also emerges when debts are measured as a proportion of the GDP. Contrary to the most comprehensive specification of our basic regression model, however, the robustness check coefficient reaches significance at the 10%-level. This can also be observed for the coefficient on energy supply per capita. In addition, the latter shows the expected negative sign and differs hence from the comparable coefficient in table I that surprisingly becomes positive when the EU dummy is added. Finally, the coefficients of the tax revenue as a percentage of GDP and the lagged GDP per capita growth rate change the signs as compared to their counterparts in the last column of table I. However, since all four coefficients lack statistical significance these variations are not further discussed at this point.
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS: VAT ON ELECTRICITY A. Basic Results
As in the case of the corporate income tax rate, we run linear OLS estimations with different regressor combinations to examine the relationship between the tax rate and the degree of vertical separation. Apart from replacing our main explanatory variable by the VAT rate on electricity, we draw on all control variables already familiar from the regressions repoted in table I. Table III provides the estimation results. The bivariate model depicted in the first column offers a negative and statistically significant coefficient and suggests hence a liberalization-enhancing effect of higher electricity VAT rates. This would be in line with our conjecture only ifdespite lower electricity prices in more competitive markets -VAT revenues increase on deregulated markets due to rising electricity consumption.
If this is indeed the case, we have to expect important changes with respect to the coefficients of the control variables added in column (2): High tax revenues in a certain year will always imply a higher budget of the regulatory authority in the following period, since in case of a favourable budgetary situation of the state more financial means will be placed at the disposal of ministries and the affiliated institutions. Hence, we expect a positive sign of the lagged tax revenue coefficient, because after receiving substantial financial means raising the regulator's budget by tightening the unbundling requirements is no longer necessary. A high debt service, on the contrary, hampers the allocation of funds to the authority in the subsequent year and fosters stronger forms of separation. A negative government debt coefficient would therefore be reasonable. Apart from one exception in column (4) the tax yield coefficients show the expected positive sign, but cannot reach statistical significance in any estimation. The debt coefficients, on the contrary, are all statistically highly significant. However, in comparison to table I they do not change their signs and suggest a competition-hampering effect of high budgetary deficits which is rather surprising at this point. The result of column (1), though, is strongly underpinned: After adding both the lagged tax revenue and the lagged government debt as well as country and year dummies neither the significance level nor the sign of the VAT rate change.
Controlling for the recent economic development in column (3) does not challenge the robustness of our main result, as the highly significant negative VAT rate coefficient displays. However, as in table I the growth rate coefficient shows the expected positive sign only in the last column. It is merely statistically significant (at the 10% level) in one single case when its sign challenges the "crisis hypothesis". (1)- (7) show estimation results of standard linear OLS estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
The results from the third estimation also persist when we take the energy supply per GDP unit into account in column (4) . The coefficient on the electricity VAT rate keeps its negative sign and is still significant at the 1% level, thus further substantiating that higher VAT tax rates are conducive to the implementation of stricter forms of unbundling. The coefficients on energy intensity show the expected negative sign and suggest a positive relationship between primary energy supply and liberalization efforts which is, apart from column (5), statistically highly significant.
Column (5) additionally controls for the presence of bribery by including Transparency International's CPI. As expected, all three index coefficients in columns (5) to (7) are negative and statistically highly significant. The finding of a liberalization-enhancing effect of higher VAT rates previously suggested is further supported, since both the sign and the significance level of the tax rate coefficient do not change.
The latter result also persists when we extend the estimation by Potrafke's ideology index [8] in the penultimate column. Furthermore, both highly significant positive coefficients on ideology underpin that a keener interest in fostering competition exists in countries with right-of-center governments.
The last column finally adds an EU dummy. As expected, its coefficient shows a negative sign, but unlike in table I it does not reach statistical significance. In addition, the inclusion of the dummy reduces the significance level of the VAT rate coefficient to 5%. However, this does not challenge the positive relationship between the VAT rate and the degree of separation.
B. Robustness Checks
As in subsection IV-B, we check the robustness of our results by varying several control variables. We apply the same alternative regressors as in .8481 N 287 Note: Eestimation results of standard linear OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
The significant negative coefficient on the VAT rate suggests a positive relationship between tax rate and degree of unbundling and therefore confirms the estimation results reported in table III. Besides, also the separation-enhancing effect of right-wing governments and a low level of corruption are corroborated by statistically highly significant negative coefficients. Additionally, a separation-enhancing effect of an EU membership is revealed, which is surprisingly missing when our basic regression model is estimated (column (7) of table III). The remaining control variables are statistically insignificant, hence casting doubt on both the positive effect of a high energy intensity and a low level of debt on the degree of unbundling suggested earlier by the basic results.
VI. CONCLUSION
The estimation results reveal a statistically significant negative relationship between the corporate income tax rate and the competitiveness of electricity markets in OECD countries, as measured by the degree of unbundling. This is in line with the hypothesis that regulators are rather reluctant to foster deregulation when they can benefit more from excessive utility profits realized in non-competitive environments: A higher corporate income tax rate increases the tax share of corporate earnings and hence the possibilities for the government to enhance the regulator's funding which was and often still is related to the public budget in different ways.
The estimation results for the VAT on electricity, on the contrary, show a statistically significant separation-enhancing effect of higher tax rates. This would be in line with our conjecture only if -despite lower prices in more competitive markets -VAT revenues increase after deregulation due to rising electricity consumption, providing the government and hence the regulator with a greater financial leeway.
The results indicate that, in electricity markets, a clear delineation of the regulator's budgetary or financial interests from its regulatory goals is vital to achieve the latter. As long as the authority's budget and/or the salaries paid to its employees are indirectly affected by the sectoral tax payments that, in turn, depend on the prevailing market structure, competitionhampering regulations such as an insufficient degree of unbundling cannot be ruled out.
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